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capital markets, are more sensitive to negative profitability and equity value shocks, making them
more susceptible to bankruptcy risk.
Armen Hovakimian
Department of  Economics and Finance
Baruch College Zicklin School of Business
1 Bernard Baruch Way




E.J. Ourso School of Business
Louisiana State University






McCombs School of Business





The probability of bankruptcy plays a central role in what is generally referred to as 
the static tradeoff theory of capital structure.  This theory, which postulates that firms 
choose their capital structures by trading off the benefits of debt financing (e.g., tax 
shields) against the costs associated with financial distress and bankruptcy, has been 
tested in the past by regressing various debt ratios on firm characteristics that proxy for 
the costs of bankruptcy and the tax benefits of debt.  As we argue in this paper, 
regressions of firm-level Standard and Poor’s (S&P) credit ratings and other measures of 
the probability of default provide a more direct test of this theory.  Specifically, they 
allow us to test whether firms that are likely to generate the highest levels of taxable 
income and have the lowest bankruptcy costs choose capital structures that result in the 
highest probabilities of bankruptcy.    
In our analysis, we use two primary measures of the probability of default – firm-
level S&P credit ratings and Moody’s KMV Expected Default Frequency
TM (EDF
TM). 
Our evidence generated from regressions of these measures of default probability on firm 
characteristics produce estimates that are inconsistent with the implications of the static 
tradeoff hypothesis. In particular, we find that larger firms and firms with proportionally 
more tangible assets and lower R&D expenses tend to choose capital structures that result 
in lower default probabilities as measured by credit ratings and EDF. In addition, 
marginal tax rates are negatively associated with both measures of default probabilities. 
The finding that firms with lower costs of bankruptcy and higher potential tax gains from 
leverage tend to choose capital structures with lower exposure to bankruptcy risk are 
opposite to the predictions of the static tradeoff model. 4 
 
This rejection of the static tradeoff model should probably make us somewhat more 
tentative when we discuss the model’s implications to our MBA and undergraduate 
students.  However, the rejection of this model should not be particularly troubling to 
theorists who have long recognized that optimal capital structure is a dynamic rather than 
a static problem. Indeed, there are dynamic theories in the literature that may be 
consistent with the above regressions.  For example, Myers (1984) suggests that 
profitable firms tend to retain their earnings and Baker and Wurgler (2002) suggest that 
equity issuance choices are affected by market timing considerations.  The behavior 
described in these papers suggest that as successful firms grow and mature, they may end 
up with more tangible assets on their balance sheets, higher expected tax rates, relatively 
less debt, and hence, lower default probabilities.  However, while we do find that older 
more mature firms tend to have lower probabilities of default, firm age does not explain 
away the puzzling effects of size, tangibility, and marginal tax rates. 
The above dynamic arguments implicitly assume that recapitalization costs are high 
relative to the costs of being optimally capitalized. Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989), 
along with more recent papers described below, provide dynamic models that explicitly 
account for these recapitalization costs.  In these models, capital structure and the 
probability of bankruptcy are determined by transaction costs as well as by bankruptcy 
costs.  To understand this, consider a large firm with relatively low transaction and 
information costs associated with issuing equity.  Such a firm can be relatively highly 
levered without risking default, since it has the opportunity to raise equity capital or sell 
assets when it is facing financial difficulties. In contrast, a smaller firm with fewer 
tangible assets may have higher transaction costs or in other ways find it more difficult to 5 
 
raise equity or sell assets when it is doing poorly, and may thus have a higher probability 
of bankruptcy for any given debt ratio.  
To explore these issues in more detail we estimate regime-switching regressions that 
estimate the extent to which access to capital affects how corporate capital structures 
respond to negative shocks. In these regressions, we assume that a firm’s access to capital 
markets is influenced by the firm’s size and the tangibility of its assets.  Our hypothesis is 
that smaller firms with fewer tangible assets have less access to external equity capital 
when they are doing poorly and, hence, may be more susceptible to negative profitability 
and market value shocks. The results of these regressions are consistent this hypothesis. 
Debt ratios of firms with less access to capital are more sensitive to negative shocks, 
which can explain why such firms have higher bankruptcy risk. 
Our analysis of these issues builds on a number of papers in the capital structure 
literature.  First, we extend the cross-sectional analysis of Titman and Wessels (1988) and 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) who examine the cross-sectional determinants of capital 
structure, and more recent evidence by Graham et al. (1998) who examines how taxes 
influence capital structure choices. However, our evidence suggests that some of the 
results in these papers that support the static tradeoff theory should be reinterpreted.  
First, the observation that larger firms tend to have more debt is generally interpreted 
as arising from the fact that larger firms are less risky, have lower proportional 
bankruptcy costs, and have better access to debt markets.  If the motivation for a higher 
debt ratio is lower bankruptcy costs, then we might expect large firms to have a higher 
bankruptcy probability, which is inconsistent with our findings. Second, Graham et al. 
finds that firms with high expected marginal taxes tend to have higher debt ratios. 6 
 
However, we find that firms with higher marginal tax rates are associated with lower debt 
ratios and lower default probabilities, which is inconsistent with the static tax 
gain/bankruptcy cost tradeoff models.
1 
As we mentioned earlier, our analysis is also motivated by a number of recent 
dynamic capital structure models that build on the work of Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner 
(1989) and Leland (1994).  These include papers by Hennessy and Whited (2005), 
Strebulaev (2007), and Titman and Tsyplakov (2007), which emphasize rebalancing costs 
as determinants of capital structure. The results in these papers suggest that refinancing 
costs and constraints are likely to be of first order importance in understanding the 
probability of default. Our findings provide empirical support for these theoretical 
predictions. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents an overview of our proxies for 
the default probability (ie. S&P issuer credit ratings and Moody’s EDF) and includes a 
discussion for the rating process. Section 2 provides a description of our data sources and 
discusses our sample of rated and unrated firms. Section 3 presents the results of 
regressions of debt ratios and proxies for default probabilities that test the static tradeoff 
theory. Section 4 presents the analysis of leverage dynamics using a switching 
regressions model. Section 5 presents our conclusions. 
1.  Default Probability Measures 
In this section we provide a brief discussion of our probability of default measures: 
S&P issuer credit ratings and Moody’s KMV Expected Default Frequency (EDF).  The 
section on ratings provide a brief overview of the rating process, which explains the 
information content of ratings relative to other measures of capital structure.  In addition 7 
 
to private conversations, our information comes from Standard & Poor’s Corporate 
Ratings Criteria (2006) manual, which we quote from below.   
1.1. S&P Issuer Ratings 
    Issuer credit ratings used in this study reflect the obligor’s overall capacity and 
willingness to meet its financial obligations (whether they are rated or not) as they come 
due, i.e., they measure the firm’s risk of default.  Several important features about the 
issuer credit ratings that distinguish them from issue credit ratings are worth noting.  
First, issuer credit ratings are not specific to any financial obligation.  Consequently, they 
do not take into account the specific nature or provisions of any particular obligation.  
Furthermore, they do not take into account recovery prospects or statutory or regulatory 
preferences.  They also do not take into account the creditworthiness of guarantors, 
insurers, or other forms of credit enhancement that may pertain to a specific obligation.
2  
An important implication of these features is that issuer credit ratings do not incorporate 
information about loss-given-default, which is relevant for the ratings on particular bond 
issues (S&P Manual, page 11).  
Ratings reflect “relative” rankings of credit risk at each point in time without 
reference to an explicit time horizon.  Specifically, Standard & Poor’s states that its 
“credit ratings are meant to be forward-looking, and their time horizon extends as far as 
is analytically foreseeable (S&P Manual, page 33).”  What this means is that although 
credit ratings provide an ordinal ranking of default risk across firms, depending on the 
business cycle, the mapping between ratings and short-run default probabilities may 
change. 8 
 
In addition to incorporating various aspects of a firm’s capital structure, the analytic 
framework used to produce ratings includes other qualitative, such as the company’s 
competitiveness within its industry and the caliber of management, as well as quantitative 
factors.  Moreover, rating agencies have access to private information through their 
meetings with the management during which they "review in detail the company’s key 
operating and financial plans, management policies, and other credit factors that have an 
impact on the rating (S&P Manual, page 15).” Standard and Poor’s further states that 
“[M]anagement’s financial projections are a valuable tool in the rating process, because 
they indicate management’s plans, how management assesses the company’s challenges, 
and how it intends to deal with problems. Projections also depict the company’s financial 
strategy in terms of anticipated reliance on internal cash flow or outside funds, and they 
help articulate management’s financial objectives and policies (S&P Manual, page 16).”   
In summary, one should keep in mind that ratings aggregate information from various 
sources and include soft as well as hard information, both historical and forward looking.  
Because of this, they are likely to more precisely measure a firm’s default probability 
than measures of capital structure based solely on a firm’s current balance sheet. On the 
downside, the inclusion of soft information makes credit ratings more subjective and 
increases the likelihood that they may be influenced by political and commercial 
considerations.    
1.2. Expected Default Frequency (EDF) 
Moody’s KMV Expected Default Frequency (EDF) is our second measure of the 
probability of bankruptcy.  Moody’s KMV constructs this measure using a structural 
model that converts the volatility adjusted measure of market leverage (which Moody’s 9 
 
KMV calls Distance-to-Default) into an actual probability of default.
3  The use of market 
leverage (which is based on the market value of a company’s assets) instead of book 
leverage allows the EDF measure to reflect the changes in the firm’s stock price.  The 
sensitivity of default probability measured by EDF to changes in stock prices depends on 
the level of leverage and the volatility of firm’s assets: if a firm has high leverage and 
high volatility then the firm’s default probability will be more sensitive to changes in the 
market value of its assets. 
EDF has a number of advantages as a measure of default risk. Unlike issuer credit 
ratings, which measure the “relative probability of default” at a fixed number of discrete 
levels, EDF is a continuous “absolute” measure of default risk that changes over the 
course of the credit cycle reflecting the changes in the level of default risk.  Further it is 
based on market prices rather than potentially politically and commercially biased 
opinions. Finally, KMV covers a very broad cross-section of the firms on Compustat, and 
as a result, using the EDF variable need not have the same sample selection issues that 
arise in the analysis of credit ratings. Like credit ratings, EDF does not contain 
information on the loss given default and is not impacted by the liquidity of the bond 
market or the CDS market.  On the negative side, EDF may be directly related to some of 
our variables, which could be a potential source of bias if there are errors in the KMV 
model. 
2.  Data 
Our measure of credit rating is the S&P long-term issuer level rating extracted from 
Compustat.
4 The letter ratings are transformed into numerical equivalents using an 
ordinal scale ranging from 1 for the highest rated firms (AAA) to 16 for the lowest rated 10 
 
firms (B-).
5  The financial statement data are also from Compustat.  The stock return data 
are from CRSP.  The simulated marginal tax rates are provided by John Graham.
6 The 
EDF measure of one-year default probability is from Moody’s KMV.  The sample covers 
the period between 1985 and 2008.
7 
As in other studies of capital structure, we exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000-
6999) from the sample.  In addition, we restrict the sample to include firms with book 
value of assets and sales above $1 million.  To limit the influence of outliers, all ratio 
variables are trimmed at the top one percent and, for variables that take on negative 
values, bottom one percent of their values.
8  Observations with missing values of the 
relevant variables are excluded. The resulting sample consists of 46,219 firm-year 
observations. The EDF measure of default probability is available for all sample 
observations, whereas only 11,110 of the sample observations are for firms with credit 
ratings. 
Table 1 presents the distribution of our sample firms by rating and year.  Overall, the 
number of rated firms increases over time during our sample period.  In addition, the 
overall credit quality of our sample firms declines during the sample period.
9 Table 2 
reports the values of EDF and selected firm characteristics traditionally used in capital 
structure research for each rating category. The results show that the values of the two 
different measures of the bankruptcy risk, credit ratings and EDF, are broadly consistent 
with each other. The results also show discernible patterns in how firm characteristics 
vary across credit ratings, suggesting that better rated firms tend to be larger and more 
profitable and tend to have higher market-to-book ratios, R&D, and marginal tax rates. 11 
 
In Table 3, we present the firm characteristics that are important for our subsequent 
analysis for the subsamples of firms with and without credit ratings.
 10 Rated firms tend to 
be older, larger, more profitable, and tend to have higher asset tangibility, as well as 
higher book and market debt ratios, marginal tax rates, and market-to-book ratios. About 
42.3 (3.0) percent of rated (unrated) firms are in the S&P 500 large-cap index, 15 (4.6) 
percent are in the S&P400 mid-cap index, and about 76.7 (22.6) percent are traded on the 
NYSE exchange. Compared to unrated firms, rated firms come from industries with 
higher fractions of rated firms. Unrated firms tend to have larger R&D and selling 
expenses and higher operating risk.
11  The average one-year default probability is about 
five percent for unrated firms and 1.6 percent for rated firms. The average rating is about 
10, i.e., BBB-. 
3.  Static tradeoff theory tests 
3.1. Empirical design  
Our empirical design assumes that firms choose their capital structures as the result of 
a tradeoff between the tax gains and the financial distress and bankruptcy costs associated 
with higher levels of debt.  Within the context of this simple theory, firms that have the 
most to gain, in tax benefits, and the least to lose, in financial distress and bankruptcy 
costs, will choose capital structures that have higher probabilities of bankruptcy.  To test 
this theory we estimate the following regression of the probability of bankruptcy on 
proxies for the costs and benefits of higher leverage:   
                              . (1) 
This approach is similar to the existing tests of the cross-sectional determinants of capital 
structure that seek to explain debt ratio measures with a set of proxies for tax benefits of 12 
 
financial leverage and costs of financial distress.  Our proxies for PrBit are issuer credit 
ratings and EDF.  Following prior studies, our set of firm characteristics, Z, consists of 
variables such as firm size, asset tangibility, market-to-book, research and development 
(R&D) expenses, selling expenses, profitability, operating risk, the simulated marginal 
tax rates (before interest), and firm age. The regressions also include industry indicators 
to control for fixed industry factors, j, and year indicators to control for macroeconomic 
effects, t.
12  
Note that, in contrast to traditional regressions in the literature that examines how 
rating agencies assign corporate credit ratings (see for example, Pogue and Soldofsky 
(1969), Pinches and Mingo (1973), and Kaplan and Urwitz (1979), Ederington (1985), 
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003), Molina (2005)), the above regressions do not include debt 
ratio as an explanatory variable. These regressions assume that firms understand that 
when they choose a specific capital structure, they are, in effect, choosing a specific risk 
of default, which is measured by credit ratings and EDF.
13 In this context, the debt ratio is 
an endogenous parameter that allows the firm to achieve its chosen probability of 
bankruptcy.
  
Since part of our exercise is to re-examine the stylized facts about the empirical 
evidence for the static tradeoff model, we also run these same regressions with debt 
scaled by capital (debt + equity), rather than with probability of bankruptcy, as the 
dependent variable.
14 
                                      . (2) 13 
 
As we discussed in the introduction, the focus of this research is on how the coefficients 
of the regressions with proxies for the probability of bankruptcy as the dependent 
variable differ from the regressions with the debt ratio dependent variables. 
3.2. Self-Selection 
It is important to note that not all firms have ratings and that firms that self-select to 
issue rated debt are likely to be inherently different from firms that do not.
15 The 
comparison of the characteristics of rated and unrated firms in Table 3 confirms this 
intuition. To the extent that there are unobservable determinants of both the target capital 
structure and access to the bond market, the coefficients from capital structure models (1) 
and (2) estimated on the sample of rated firms may be biased. 
We address the self-selection problem by explicitly modeling access to the public 
debt market with a set of instruments that are unrelated to the level of rating and the 
amount of debt.
16 The selection equation has the following form: 
                                                    . (3) 
In equation (3), “Rated” takes the value of one if a firm has a rating and zero 
otherwise. We use four instruments for modeling the selection decision.  Following 
Faulkender and Petersen (2006), we use proxies that measure the firms’ visibility as our 
instruments. The idea is that firms that are well known, familiar, and widely followed are 
likely to face lower costs of introducing public debt issues to the market and hence are 
more likely to get rated.  Our visibility proxies include an indicator variable for firms 
traded on NYSE and two indicator variables for the presence of the firm in the large-cap 
and the mid-cap S&P indexes.  Firms that belong to these indexes are likely to be more 
visible than otherwise similar firms. 14 
 
Another way to gauge the accessibility of the public debt markets is to see whether 
other firms in the same industry have rated debt.  If there are comparable firms with 
outstanding public debt, it may be easier for a firm to participate in the bond market. We, 
therefore, include a variable measuring the percentage of firms in the same industry that 
have rated debt as another instrument in our selection model.
17   
The selection model also includes firm characteristics that proxy for a firm’s 
propensity to participate in public debt markets. Some firms may have access to the 
(public) debt market but may choose not to issue long-term bonds.  We may, therefore, 
only observe firms that find long-term debt more valuable due to greater tax shields or 
contracting benefits and/or lower financial distress costs.  For example, large firms and 
firms with tangible assets are expected to have lower financial distress costs and hence 
are more likely to have long-term debt.  In contrast, firms with high growth opportunities 
and significant intangible assets may prefer to avoid the debt markets as they face higher 
costs of financial distress.  Our proxies for these factors are R&D intensity, selling 
expenses, age, and the market-to-book ratio.  The effect of profitability on a firm’s 
propensity to use long-term debt is theoretically ambiguous.  While debt may be used less 
by more profitable firms as a result of their lower external financing needs, such firms 
may benefit from significant debt tax shields, which should make debt financing more 
attractive. 
Table 4 presents the estimation results for the selection equation (4), estimated as a 
probit regression using maximum likelihood. The results for selection equations 
estimated simultaneously with the default probability model (1) and with the book and 
market leverage specifications of the debt ratio model (2) are similar and are not reported 15 
 
for brevity. The results show that firms that have rated debt are indeed different from the 
ones that do not have a rating. Consistent with Faulkender and Petersen (2006), the 
probability of being rated increases with visibility. NYSE traded firms and firms from the 
S&P500 large-cap and S&P400 mid-cap indexes are more likely to be rated. The 
probability of being rated increases with the fraction of rated firms in the industry. Firms 
with higher market-to-book ratios are less likely to be rated. Larger firms and firms with 
higher asset tangibility are more likely to be rated as they are more likely to have issued 
long-term debt given their lower information asymmetry and lower costs of financial 
distress. The probability of being rated increases with R&D and declines with 
profitability and age. Marginal tax rate, selling expenses and operating risk have an 
insignificant effect on the likelihood of being rated.  
3.3. Capital structure choice results 
Table 5 presents the results for the target capital structure models (1) and (2) 
estimated on the sample of rated firms using a maximum likelihood selection model. The 
reported z-statistics reflect standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm-level 
clustering. The first and the second sets of results are for the book and the market 
specifications of the target debt ratio model (2). The third set of results is for the credit 
rating specification of the probability of bankruptcy model (1). Due to the categorical and 
ordered nature of credit ratings, the target rating model (1) is estimated using an ordered 
probit specification that takes into account the fact that the “distances” between the 
adjacent ratings are not necessarily equal. The fourth set of results is for the probability of 
bankruptcy model (1) using KMV’s EDF measure of one-year default probability as the 
dependent variable. The default probability is bounded between zero and one and is a 16 
 
nonlinear function of the underlying determinants of default. To ensure that predicted 
default rates fall within the range [0,1], we use the following logit transformation of EDF 
as the dependent variable in the linear regression model (1).
18 
         ln 
EDF
  EDF . (4) 
Consistent with prior studies, the results in Table 5 show that large firms and firms 
with high asset tangibility and low R&D expenses tend to choose high debt ratios. The 
standard interpretation of this result is that large firms with high collateral value of 
tangible assets and low R&D can choose to be more highly levered because they have 
low costs of financial distress. However, in the ratings and the EDF models, we find that 
large size and high asset tangibility are associated with a lower probability of bankruptcy, 
suggesting that firms with these characteristics choose capital structures that allow them 
to default less often than small firms and firms with low tangibility. The effect of R&D 
expenses on the likelihood of bankruptcy is insignificant. These results are inconsistent 
with the static tradeoff theory that predicts that firms with low bankruptcy costs choose 
capital structures with a higher risk of default.  
The significantly negative coefficient estimates of the marginal tax rate in all four 
regressions reported in Table 5 imply that both the debt ratios and the likelihood of 
bankruptcy are lower for firms with higher marginal tax rates. These results are 
inconsistent with the static tradeoff theory, which predicts that higher marginal tax rates 
should lead to more leverage and higher default risk.
19 One possible explanation for this 
inconsistency is the correlation between simulated marginal tax rates and past and future 
operating performance, since firms with bad performance tend to have low marginal tax 
rates and high leverage ratios. Consistent with this argument, we find in unreported 17 
 
regressions that higher marginal tax rates are associated with increases in leverage, which 
is consistent with the evidence reported in Graham (1996a) who also examines the effect 
of the marginal tax rate on changes in leverage.
20 However, the coefficient estimates of 
the marginal tax rate remain significantly negative in all specifications even with 
additional proxies for past and future performance included.  
The effect of operating risk is positive in both the rating and the EDF regressions as 
well as in the book and the market debt ratio regressions. The positive relation between 
operating risk and debt ratios or probability of default is inconsistent with intuition that 
suggests that in the presence of bankruptcy costs, firms with more volatile cash flows, 
which are exposed to a higher probability of bankruptcy for any given level of debt, 
should choose less debt.  However, there is a theoretical literature that suggests that the 
relation between financial leverage and operating risk can go either way and the existing 
evidence is mixed.
21 
The effect of profitability is consistently negative across the leverage and the default 
probability regressions, contrary to our expectations under the tradeoff theory. The effect 
of profitability on leverage is generally interpreted as indicating that asymmetric 
information (Myers and Majluf (1984)) and personal taxation (Auerbach (1979)) 
considerations induce firms to retain their profits, which reduces their debt ratios. The 
above arguments imply that inside equity is a less expensive form of capital than outside 
equity, which in turn suggests that the costs of achieving a capital structure with less 
exposure to bankruptcy risk are lower for more profitable firms. The observed negative 
relation between profitability and probability of default is also consistent with this view.     18 
 
Firms with higher selling expenses tend to choose lower market debt ratios and better 
ratings. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms with more unique 
products (high selling expenses) target lower probabilities of default because they face 
high financial distress costs (Titman (1984) and Titman and Wessels (1988)). However, 
we do not find a reliable relation between EDF or book debt ratio and selling expenses. 
The effects of the market-to-book ratio is negative in the debt ratio regressions as well 
as in the default probability regressions, consistent with the hypothesis that firms with 
significant growth opportunities (high market-to-book) target capital structures with 
lower probabilities of default because of either high financial distress costs or to maintain 
financial flexibility. Hence, market-to-book ratio is the only variable that is consistent 
with the tradeoff theory in both the Ratings and the EDF regression, but that Selling 
Expense and the R&D indicator, which are indicators of financial distress costs, are 
significant in the Ratings regression. 
The effect of firm age is negative in all four regressions, though it is insignificant in 
the book debt ratio regression. This is consistent with the idea that as successful firms 
grow and mature, they end up with relatively less debt, and hence, lower default 
probabilities.  
3.4. Robustness 
The results in the previous section are from regressions estimated on the subsample of 
rated firms. These firms tend to differ from unrated firms in many respects. While the 
results reported in Table 5 are based on maximum likelihood models that account for 
self-selection into the rated group, our conclusions would be strengthened if the results 
held for all firms, rated as well as unrated.  19 
 
Table 6 presents the least-squares regression results for the EDF specification of 
model (1) and market and book leverage specifications of model (2) estimated on the 
sample of all (rated and unrated) firms. The reported t-statistics reflect standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. The book and market leverage 
results in Table 6 are consistent with those reported in Table 5, with the increase in 
significance in Table 6 being the only difference. The EDF regression results are also, 
overall, consistent with corresponding results in Table 5. The only difference is that the 
effects of R&D and selling expenses change from insignificant to significantly negative. 
These negative estimates are consistent with the predictions of the static tradeoff theory 
that firms with higher bankruptcy costs should choose capital structures with lower risk 
of default. However, the results for size, tangibility, and marginal tax rates remain 
inconsistent with the tradeoff theory, similar to the results in Table 5. 
As another robustness test, we reestimated regression model (1) with an alternative 
measure of bankruptcy risk – the CDS spread. Our CDS spreads sample is much smaller, 
consisting of observations for about 200 firms over 2006-2008. The results (not reported 
for brevity) are generally consistent with those reported in Table 5. Specifically, OLS 
regressions of CDS spreads generate significantly negative coefficient estimates for size 
and marginal tax rates and insignificant estimates for R&D and tangibility, inconsistent 
with the predictions of the static tradeoff theory about the effects of these variables on the 
choice of the exposure to bankruptcy risk. These results should, however, be interpreted 
with caution, given that the cross section is small, relatively homogeneous, and has 
inherent selection issues. Indeed, when we estimate the regression in a way that accounts 
for endogenous selection, the results are no longer significant. It should also be noted, 20 
 
that unlike credit ratings and EDF, CDS spreads incorporate information about recovery 
rates as well as the likelihood of default. 
We also considered the possibility that unobserved firm-specific factors could be 
driving our earlier results. To see whether the results are consistent with the tradeoff 
theory when within-firm rather than across-firm variation is considered, we re-estimate 
both default probability models using linear regressions with fixed firm effects.
22 The 
results are presented in Table 7. In the ratings regression, all three variables (tangibility, 
size, and marginal tax rate) have signs opposite to the static tradeoff predictions. In the 
EDF regression only size and marginal tax rate are inconsistent, whereas, consistent with 
the tradeoff theory, the effect of tangibility is significantly positive.
23 Our findings are 
also robust to alternative specifications of the capital structure regressions (1) and (2) that 
exclude both firm and industry effects.  
Finally, we address the possibility that the discrete nature of ratings and the 
institutional features of the credit markets may influence our results.
24 Kisgen (2009) 
shows that firms tend to reduce leverage following a ratings downgrade, especially when 
the rating changes from investment to speculative grade and when commercial paper 
ratings are affected. This suggests that some firms may have lower leverage than we 
would expect given their bankruptcy costs (as perhaps measured by tangible assets and 
size) because of their desire to maintain an investment grade rating. If this were true, we 
might expect a cluster of firms at BBB- with high values of tangibility and size. 
Likewise, some firms may have better credit ratings (e.g., A or higher) than their tangible 
assets or size would suggest, because they want a strong rating to be able to access the 
commercial paper market.
25  21 
 
Our unreported analysis suggests that the targeting of investment grade ratings is not 
driving our results. Specifically, a univariate analysis of the variation in size and 
tangibility across ratings categories fails to find that the average values of size and/or 
tangibility for firms with BBB- or A ratings are significantly higher than the values in 
neighboring ratings on either side. In addition, our results also continue to hold when we 
drop BBB-, BBB, A, or A- rated observations from the regressions. 
4.  Profitability shocks and debt ratio dynamics 
As we have just discussed, our finding in the previous section that default 
probabilities decline with size and tangibility is difficult to reconcile with the static 
tradeoff theory. One potential explanation for the negative effects of these variables is 
that they are correlated with the dynamic dimension of risk not picked up by our risk 
variable. Specifically, smaller firms with fewer tangible assets may have higher 
transaction and information costs or in other ways find it more difficult to raise equity or 
sell assets when doing poorly. Such financially constrained firms are likely to have a 
higher probability of bankruptcy for any given debt ratio.  
We investigate this possibility by examining how these firm characteristics affect the 
ability of firm capital structures to absorb negative shocks to their profitability.  If larger 
firms with more tangible assets are better able to make choices that offset negative 
shocks, then they may be able to maintain higher debt ratios and still have a lower 
probability of bankruptcy. 
To test whether or not this is indeed the case, we estimate an expanded partial 
adjustment leverage regression in a switching regression framework represented by the 
following two equations.  22 
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Equation (5) is a partial adjustment regression of change in debt ratio, DR, on the 
deviation from the target debt ratio, DR-DR*. Prior research, e.g., Flannery and Rangan 
(2006), has shown that deviations from target leverage tend to predict future debt ratio 
changes.
26 The standard partial adjustment model is modified as follows. First, we 
decompose the deviation from the target, DR-DR*, into two components.  (DR – DR*)
-, 
which we refer to as leverage deficit, is defined as the difference between the observed 
and target debt ratios with positive values set to zero. Similarly, (DR – DR*)
+, which we 
refer to as the leverage surplus, is defined as the difference between the observed and 
target debt ratios with negative values set to zero. By separately considering the debt ratio 
deficits and surpluses, we account for the possibility that the response by firms to being 
over-levered and under-levered may not be symmetric. From the point of view of 
financial risk, our primary focus is on (DR – DR*)
+: A firm that can quickly react to 
offset excess leverage would have a lower probability of bankruptcy. 
In addition to deviations from target leverage, regression equation (5) includes 
profitability and stock market shocks. Here again, to separately measure positive and 
negative shocks, we use positive and negative changes in profitability (ROA) and 
positive and negative stock returns, both measured contemporaneously with the change in 
leverage. From the point of view of financial risk, our primary interest is on negative 
shocks: A firm with capital structure that is less affected by negative shocks has lower 
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probability of bankruptcy. Regression equation (5) also includes past profitability in the 
form of lagged values of ROA and marginal tax rate as control variables. 
Equation (6) represents the switching equation of the endogenous switching model. 
The independent variables in this equation, firm size and tangibility, endogenously 
determine the probability that the firm is in one of two regimes. Equations (5) and (6) of 
the switching regression model are estimated simultaneously using maximum likelihood 
with robust standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering.  
The results for the switching regression model (5)-(6) are reported in Table 8. The 
coefficient estimates for the switching equation (6), reported in the first set of results in 
Table 8, show evidence of existence of two different regimes, which are determined by 
significant differences in size and tangibility. The second and the third sets of results 
show coefficient estimates for equation (5) in, respectively, regime 1 and regime 2 and 
the last column reports the p-values of pairwise tests comparing the coefficient estimates 
in the two regimes. The results reveal that larger firms and firms with more tangible 
assets (firms in regime 1) show significantly slower rebalancing toward the target debt 
ratio, which is inconsistent with our conjecture that firms with these characteristics more 
quickly adjust their capital structures to offset leverage deficits.  
The results also show that, compared to regime 2 firms, capital structures of regime 1 
firms are significantly less sensitive to both positive and negative profitability shocks. 
The sensitivity of regime 1 firms’ capital structures to negative profitability shocks is 
especially low, it is about twenty times lower than the sensitivity of regime 2 firms and is 
economically trivial (-0.013). These results imply that firms in regime 1 (large, high 
tangibility firms) are able to react more quickly to offset the impact of negative 24 
 
profitability shocks on their capital structure.  
Consistent with Welch (2004), debt ratio changes are negatively related to stock 
returns in both regimes. However, the effects for both positive and negative returns are 
significantly weaker for regime 1 firms. The difference between regime 1 and regime 2 
firms is especially large when the impact of negative returns is considered, consistent 
with larger firms with more tangible assets more successfully neutralizing the effects of 
negative shocks.   
Overall, the significantly weaker effects of negative shocks on capital structure of 
regime 1 firms imply that firms in regime 1 are able to manage their capital structure 
dynamics in a manner that reduces their risk of bankruptcy. 
5.  Conclusions 
The static tax gain/bankruptcy cost tradeoff model is clearly a gross simplification of 
the firm’s capital structure problem.  However, since this model provides the central 
framework of the capital structure theory that we teach our MBA and undergraduate 
students, and provides the intuitive basis for most of our cross-sectional capital structure 
tests, it is important to understand the extent to which it explains the data.   
The evidence in this paper suggests that the static tradeoff theory fails on a couple of 
important dimensions.  Specifically, we find that firms with the lowest bankruptcy and 
financial distress costs, i.e., larger firms and firms with more tangible assets, have the 
lowest probability of bankruptcy.  In addition, firms with the lowest marginal tax rates 
tend to have the highest probability of bankruptcy. 
This evidence suggests that the puzzle we identify is related in part to the fact that 
smaller firms with less tangible assets are more constrained in their ability to take steps, 25 
 
like issuing equity and selling assets, that offset the effect of negative shocks on their 
capital structures. Specifically, the leverage ratios of these firms increase much more in 
response to negative shocks than do larger firms with more tangible assets. As a result, 
these firms may be exposed to more bankruptcy risk even if their current capital 
structures are more conservative.  
While this evidence may explain why firms with relatively high bankruptcy costs tend 
to have relatively high probabilities of bankruptcy, this is not likely to be a complete 
explanation for why larger firms with more tangible assets tend to have fairly 
conservative debt ratios.  Our evidence indicates that the ratings of these firms are 
somewhat less sensitive to their capital structures, since these firms are likely to take 
steps to offset negative shocks.  This in turn indicates that large firms with tangible assets 
can probably increase their debt ratios, allowing them to take advantage of the tax 
shields, without suffering substantial increases in their probabilities of bankruptcy. 
Finally, it should be noted that our study has implications for the recent literature that 
compares the magnitude of tax gains and bankruptcy costs. A number of earlier studies 
(e.g., Andrade and Kaplan (1998), Graham (2000)) argued that U.S. firms appear to be 
underleveraged, in the sense that expected bankruptcy costs are substantially lower than 
the value of forgone tax benefits. However, more recent papers, which provide alternative 
quantitative estimates of expected bankruptcy costs (Almeida and Phillipon (2007)), net 
benefits of debt (Korteweg (2010)), or the sensitivity of the probability of default to 
leverage (Molina (2005)), suggest that the firms may not be as underleveraged, on 
average. Our findings add a cross-sectional dimension to the leverage puzzle.   
Specifically, we argue that while it may be possible to justify the leverage ratios of either 26 
 
small firms with relatively intangible assets or large firms with relatively tangible assets, 
that a quantitative model, like Almeida and Phillipon (2007), cannot possibly explain the 
capital structures of both type firms. 27 
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Table 1. Distribution of ratings 
 
   AAA  AA+  AA  AA-  A+  A  A-  BBB+  BBB  BBB-  BB+  BB  BB-  B+  B  B-  Total 
1985  9  2  22 15 30 46 20 19 24 14 15 25 27 38 10  9  325 
1986  11  6  18 15 34 43 27 31 28 21 15 34 46 78 15  8  430 
1987  12  4  18 15 33 40 29 23 29 22 23 32 44 84 13 10  431 
1988  12  5  16 14 33 35 30 22 25 24 25 28 36 59 17  9  390 
1989  12  6  16 17 24 37 26 24 29 24 23 29 34 51 12  9  373 
1990  10  6  19 15 23 30 34 21 32 27 18 27 27 34 12  7  342 
1991  10  5  18 17 22 36 33 27 33 22 17 29 25 37 12  5  348 
1992  11  4  19 17 20 44 31 28 32 32 16 32 27 38  8  5  364 
1993  9  5  17 16 25 41 30 30 39 30 21 30 40 33 10  6  382 
1994  9  4  18 14 23 45 26 34 40 32 21 29 41 38 13  4  391 
1995  9  5  16 17 20 49 26 35 35 23 18 32 34 32 11  6  368 
1996  9  4  15 19 24 57 35 47 40 53 22 45 45 52 23 12  502 
1997  8  5  13 15 27 60 30 55 44 51 27 52 51 58 26  7  529 
1998  7  4  10 19 27 53 36 53 49 46 33 44 66 55 18  7  527 
1999  8  3  9  13 25 55 30 55 59 44 38 56 67 60 26  8  556 
2000  7  1  8  13 25 41 35 49 57 47 33 56 72 58 26  7  535 
2001  6  1  7  11 23 39 36 41 55 50 39 69 64 62 23 14  540 
2002  5  1  9  8  25 41 32 33 69 42 42 65 77 50 25  8  532 
2003  5  1  8  8  25 45 30 33 64 43 45 53 84 58 28 11  541 
2004  4  1  8  7  24 40 34 37 68 49 39 57 79 65 30  8  550 
2005  4  1  7  5  23 44 33 38 58 57 39 66 75 61 21 14  546 
2006  4  1  6  5  21 39 30 38 57 56 33 68 67 63 20 20  528 
2007  4  1  7  5  21 46 28 38 57 57 46 55 88 57 26 13  549 
2008  4  1  5  8  18 44 24 38 65 48 39 50 80 44 37 26  531 
Total  189  77  309 308 595  1,050  725 849  1,088  914 687  1,063  1,296  1,265  462 233  11,110 
This table presents the number of our sample observations with S&P issuer credit rating across our sample period.     31
 
Table 2. Sample statistics by rating 
 
EDF Size  Tangibility MB  R&D  Profit  MTR 
AAA  0.040  9.057  0.373 2.956 0.069 0.248 0.361 
AA+  0.081  8.404  0.313 2.357 0.049 0.239 0.360 
AA  0.058  8.741  0.400 2.626 0.045 0.224 0.364 
AA-  0.092  8.316  0.355 2.263 0.027 0.208 0.356 
A+ 0.108 8.160 0.370  2.153  0.026  0.210  0.360 
A 0.150  7.900  0.356 1.933 0.027 0.184 0.351 
A-  0.225  7.755  0.369 1.749 0.022 0.179 0.349 
BBB+  0.268  7.460  0.388 1.684 0.021 0.175 0.349 
BBB  0.386  7.446  0.368 1.480 0.016 0.156 0.340 
BBB-  0.618  7.365  0.340 1.468 0.013 0.151 0.329 
BB+  0.939  6.947  0.368 1.490 0.016 0.155 0.326 
BB  1.376  6.535  0.367 1.399 0.011 0.145 0.316 
BB-  2.318  6.261  0.347 1.422 0.020 0.146 0.318 
B+  4.050  5.832  0.339 1.312 0.025 0.122 0.305 
B 7.972  5.798  0.353 1.308 0.042 0.093 0.256 
B-  10.188  5.715  0.381 1.454 0.051 0.054 0.210 
 
The table presents selected firm characteristics for each rating category. Rating is the S&P issuer-level 
credit rating. EDF is the Expected Default Frequency from Moody’s KMV. Size is the natural log of sales, 
adjusted for inflation. Tangibility is the property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets. Market-to-
book is (total assets – book equity + market equity)/total assets. R&D is the research and development 
expense scaled by sales. Profitability is (operating income)/assets. Marginal tax rate is the simulated 
before-interest marginal tax rate. 
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Table 3 
Sample statistics by rated status 
 
 Not  Rated  Rated 
S&P500 indicator  0.030  0.423** 
S&P400 indicator  0.046  0.150** 
NYSE indicator  0.226  0.767** 
Probability rated  0.158  0.221** 
Market-to-book 1.607  1.635* 
Tangibility 0.284  0.360** 
R&D 0.037  0.023** 
R&D indicator  0.663  0.624** 
Selling expense  0.281  0.201** 
Profitability 0.123  0.159** 
Size 4.152  7.091** 
Operating risk  0.075  0.047** 
Marginal tax rate  0.285  0.328** 
Age 2.697  3.165** 
Market debt/capital  0.235  0.317** 
Book debt/capital  0.291  0.447** 
EDF (%)  4.974 1.616** 
Rating   9.823** 
Observations 35,109  11,110 
The table presents the sample means for selected firm characteristics important for our analysis. S&P500 
indicator is set to one for firms that belong to S&P500 index. S&P400 indicator is set to one for firms that 
belong to S&P400 mid-cap index. NYSE indicator is set to one for firms traded on NYSE. Probability rated 
is the percentage of rated firms in the firm’s industry. Market-to-book is (total assets – book equity + 
market equity)/total assets. Tangibility is the property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets. R&D is 
the research and development expense scaled by sales. R&D indicator is coded one when R&D is not 
missing. Selling expense is selling, general, and administrative expense over sales. Profitability is 
(operating income)/assets. Size is the natural log of sales, adjusted for inflation. Operating risk is the 
standard deviation of profitability measured over the previous four to five years. Marginal tax rate is the 
simulated before-interest marginal tax rate. Age is the natural log of the Compustat age of the firm. Market 
debt/capital is (short-term debt + long-term debt)/(short-term debt + long-term debt + market equity). Book 
debt/capital is (short-term debt + long-term debt)/(short-term debt + long-term debt + book equity). EDF is 
the Expected Default Frequency from Moody’s KMV. Rating is the S&P issuer-level credit rating. The 
statistically significant differences between the characteristics of rated and non-rated firms are marked * for 
5% level and ** for 1% level. 
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Table 4 
Determinants of access to public debt markets 
 
  Rated vs. Not rated 
 Coeff.  z-stat. 
S&P500 indicator  0.512**  6.3 
S&P400 indicator  0.151*  2.2 
NYSE indicator  0.445**  8.4 
Probability rated  1.813**  6.5 
Market-to-book -0.099**  -4.2 
Tangibility 0.788**  6.7 
R&D 1.582**  4.7 
R&D indicator  -0.190**  -3.7 
Selling expense  0.175  0.9 
Profitability -1.212**  -6.5 
Size 0.649**  28.6 
Operating risk  0.551  1.4 
Marginal tax rate  -0.071  -0.4 
Age -0.135**  -3.4 
Pseudo-R
2 0.496   
Observations 46,219   
 
The table presents maximum likelihood estimates for the probability of being rated (accessing public debt 
markets) using a probit specification. S&P500 indicator is set to one for firms that belong to S&P500 index. 
S&P400 indicator is set to one for firms that belong to S&P400 mid-cap index. NYSE indicator is set to 
one for firms traded on NYSE. Probability rated is the percentage of rated firms in the firm’s industry. 
Market-to-book is (total assets – book equity + market equity)/total assets. Tangibility is the property, 
plant, and equipment scaled by total assets. R&D is the research and development expense scaled by sales. 
R&D indicator is coded one when R&D is not missing. Selling expense is selling, general, and 
administrative expense over sales. Profitability is (operating income)/assets. Size is the natural log of sales, 
adjusted for inflation.  Operating risk is the standard deviation of profitability measured over the previous 
four to five years. Marginal tax rate is the simulated before-interest marginal tax rate. Age is the natural log 
of the Compustat age of the firm. The dependent and the independent variables are measured 
contemporaneously. The reported z-statistics reflect robust standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and firm-level clustering. Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at 5% and 1% level are 
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Table 5 
Static tradeoff model: Rated firms 
Book debt/capital  Market debt/capital  Rating  EDF 
Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Market-to-book -0.024** -3.8  -0.097**  -15.2  -0.314** -9.1  -0.648**  -16.8 
Tangibility  0.134** 3.7  0.112** 4.9  -0.390* -2.4  -0.339*  -2.2 
R&D  -0.460** -4.1  -0.244** -3.1 0.864  1.5  -0.890  -1.6 
R&D indicator  -0.024  -1.8 -0.024*  -2.6 -0.175**  -2.8 -0.072  -1.3 
Selling expense  0.008  0.1 -0.080*  -2.1 -1.149**  -4.2 -0.363  -1.4 
Profitability  -0.380** -8.4  -0.493**  -14.1  -2.754**  -11.5  -3.446**  -14.1 
Size  0.032* 2.5  0.005  1.0  -0.311**  -6.7  -0.129**  -3.8 
Operating risk  0.356** 3.2  0.272** 3.4  5.192**  10.7  6.686**  12.5 
Marginal tax rate  -0.245** -5.4  -0.165** -5.3  -1.986** -9.4  -2.861**  -12.4 
Age  -0.012  -1.4 -0.020**  -3.0 -0.260**  -6.2 -0.286** -6.7 
Log-likelihood -10,948    -7,718    -34,888  -29,711   
Observations 46,219    46,219    46,219  46,219   
Uncensored obs.  11,110    11,110    11,110  11,110   
 
The table presents maximum likelihood estimates of the capital structure regressions with sample selection correction. The sample selection (i.e., the probability 
of being rated) is modeled using a binomial probit specification from Table 4. The rating regression is modeled using an ordered probit specification. Rating is 
the S&P issuer-level credit rating. The letter ratings are transformed into numerical equivalents using an ordinal scale ranging from 1 for the highest rated firms 
(AAA) to 16 for the lowest rated sample firms (B-). EDF is the Expected Default Frequency from Moody’s KMV. Book debt/capital is (short-term debt + long-
term debt)/(short-term debt + long-term debt + book equity). Market debt/capital is (short-term debt + long-term debt)/(short-term debt + long-term debt + 
market equity). Market-to-book is (total assets – book equity + market equity)/total assets. Tangibility is the property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets. 
R&D is the research and development expense scaled by sales. R&D indicator is coded one when R&D is not missing. Selling expense is selling, general, and 
administrative expense over sales. Profitability is (operating income)/assets. Size is the natural log of sales, adjusted for inflation. Operating risk is the standard 
deviation of profitability measured over the previous four to five years. Marginal tax rate is the simulated before-interest marginal tax rate. Age is the natural log 
of the Compustat age of the firm. The dependent and the independent variables are measured contemporaneously. Industry and year indicators are included in the 
models as control variables but are not reported. The reported z-statistics reflect robust standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. 
Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at 5% and 1% level are marked * and **, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Static tradeoff model: Rated and unrated firms 
 
EDF  Book debt/capital  Market debt/capital 
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Market-to-book -0.602** -40.7  -0.013** -5.4  -0.066** -34.0 
Tangibility  -0.315** -3.0  0.215**  12.0 0.170**  11.9 
R&D  -1.802** -7.6 -0.395**  -7.5 -0.225** -6.9 
R&D indicator  -0.092* -2.3  -0.027**  -3.7  -0.025**  -4.1 
Selling expense  -0.753** -6.2 -0.109**  -4.8 -0.137** -8.4 
Profitability  -3.012** -27.1  -0.454**  -21.1  -0.393** -26.5 
Size  -0.302** -25.4  0.025**  13.5  0.011**  7.5 
Operating risk  6.061** 24.0  0.237** 4.8 -0.020  -0.6 
Marginal tax rate  -3.091** -26.1  -0.279**  -12.3  -0.159**  -9.5 
Age -0.286**  -9.8  -0.015**  -2.8  -0.022**  -5.4 
R
2 0.585    0.178    0.324 
Observations  46,219    46,219 46,219 
 
The table presents estimates of the capital structure regressions on a full sample of rated and unrated firms. 
EDF is the Expected Default Frequency from Moody’s KMV. Book debt/capital is (short-term debt + long-
term debt)/(short-term debt + long-term debt + book equity). Market debt/capital is (short-term debt + long-
term debt)/(short-term debt + long-term debt + market equity). Market-to-book is (total assets – book 
equity + market equity)/total assets. Tangibility is the property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets. 
R&D is the research and development expense scaled by sales. R&D indicator is coded one when R&D is 
not missing. Selling expense is selling, general, and administrative expense over sales. Profitability is 
(operating income)/assets. Size is the natural log of sales, adjusted for inflation. Risk is the standard 
deviation of profitability measured over the previous four to five years. Marginal tax rate is the simulated 
before-interest marginal tax rate. Age is the natural log of the Compustat age of the firm. The dependent 
and the independent variables are measured contemporaneously. Industry and year indicators are included 
in the models as control variables but are not reported. The reported t-statistics reflect robust standard 
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. Coefficient estimates significantly different 
from zero at 5% and 1% level are marked * and **, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Static tradeoff model: Within-firm determinants of default probability 
Rating EDF 
Coef. t Coef. t 
Market-to-book -0.193**  -4.3  -0.517**  -36.6 
Tangibility  -1.250** -2.9  0.703**  5.4 
R&D  -1.981* -2.2  -0.826** -3.1 
R&D indicator  0.564* 2.5  0.061  1.1 
Selling expense  -2.190** -3.4  -0.644**  -4.6 
Profitability  -2.527** -7.5  -2.513** -25.9 
Size  -1.046** -10.6  -0.188**  -7.9 
Operating risk  3.742** 4.9  3.381** 15.4 
Marginal tax rate  -1.136** -3.9  -1.659** -19.8 
Age -0.813**  -3.2  -0.070  -1.1 
R
2 0.526    0.506   
Observations 11,110    46,219   
 
The table presents the estimates of the bankruptcy probability regressions with fixed firm and year effects. 
Rating is the S&P issuer-level credit rating. The letter ratings are transformed into numerical equivalents 
using an ordinal scale ranging from 1 for the highest rated firms (AAA) to 16 for the lowest rated sample 
firms (B-). EDF is the Expected Default Frequency from Moody’s KMV. Market-to-book is (total assets – 
book equity + market equity)/total assets. Tangibility is the property, plant, and equipment scaled by total 
assets. R&D is the research and development expense scaled by sales. R&D indicator is coded one when 
R&D is not missing. Selling expense is selling, general, and administrative expense over sales. Profitability 
is (operating income)/assets. Size is the natural log of sales, adjusted for inflation. Risk is the standard 
deviation of profitability measured over the previous four to five years. Marginal tax rate is the simulated 
before-interest marginal tax rate. Age is the natural log of the Compustat age of the firm. The dependent 
and the independent variables are measured contemporaneously. The reported t-statistics reflect robust 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. Coefficient estimates significantly 
different from zero at 5% and 1% level are marked * and **, respectively. 
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Table 8  
Debt ratio dynamics in a switching regression framework 
 
  Switching: Regime 2 vs. Regime 1  Change in debt/capital: Regime 1  Change in debt/capital: Regime 2  Regime 2 vs. 1 
  Coeff. z-stat. Coeff. z-stat. Coeff. z-stat.  p-value 
(Actual – Target) (-)      -0.045**  -12.2  -0.270**  -21.9  0.000 
(Actual – Target) (+)      -0.018  -1.6  -0.120**  -12.3  0.000 
Profitability shock (+)      -0.053**  -4.0  -0.117**  -4.9  0.029 
Profitability shock (-)      -0.013*  -2.5  -0.258**  -11.4  0.000 
Return  (+)      -0.006** -4.1  -0.024** -9.0  0.000 
Return (-)      -0.018**  -7.3  -0.111**  -16.6  0.000 
Profitability     -0.001  -0.2  -0.067**  -6.0  0.000 
Marginal tax rate      0.004  1.0  0.095**  8.4   0.000 
Intercept  0.283**  7.8  -0.040** -19.4  -0.142** -16.5  0.000 
Size -0.035**  -8.6          
Tangibility -0.095*  -2.3          
Log-likelihood  38,430          
Observations   35,875                  
 
The table presents maximum likelihood estimates of an endogenous switching regression, where the likelihood function endogenously sorts the observations in 
one of the two regimes of debt ratio dynamics.  The dependent variable in the structural equation with two regimes is the change in the book debt/capital.  Book 
debt/capital is (short-term debt + long-term debt)/(short-term debt + long-term debt + book equity). (Actual – Target)(-) is the difference between the lagged and 
the target debt/capital ratios, with positive values reset to zero. (Actual – Target)(+) is the difference between the lagged and the target debt/capital ratios, with 
negative values reset to zero. Target debt/capital is the predicted value from the book debt/capital regression from Table 6. Profitability is (operating 
income)/assets. Profitability shock (+) is the change in profitability, with the negative values reset to zero. Profitability shock (-) is the change in profitability, 
with the positive values reset to zero. Return (+) is the one-year stock return, with the negative values reset to zero. Return (-) is the one-year stock return, with 
the positive values reset to zero. Marginal tax rate is the simulated before-interest marginal tax rate. Size is the natural log of sales, adjusted for inflation. 
Tangibility is the property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets. The dependent variable, change in debt/capital, is measured contemporaneously with 
profitability shocks and stock returns. All other independent variables are lagged. The reported z-statistics reflect robust standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at 5% and 1% level are marked * and **, respectively 
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1 There are number of potential reasons for why our results and Graham et al. (1998) findings on marginal tax rates in debt ratio 
regressions might be inconsistent.  For example, our variable constructions are slightly different.  For example, we use both book 
leverage and market leverage and scale them by total market capitalization, (we scale book debt either by book debt plus market 
equity or by book debt plus book equity), whereas Graham scales book debt by market value of assets (total assets minus book equity 
plus market equity).  However, the negative relation between the debt ratios and the marginal tax rate appears to be quite robust with 
respect to various leverage definitions, subsamples, and the inclusion/exclusion of various variables in the regression specification. 
  We can, however, replicate the positive coefficient (but not its magnitude) found in Graham et al. (1998) with their specific 
specification.  However, this result appears to be sensitive to the inclusion and exclusion of various control variables. 
2 See Standard and Poor’s Corporate Ratings Criteria (2006), page 9, for the discussion on the definition of issuer credit ratings.   
3 Moody’s uses Vasicek-Kealhofer structural model (Kealhofer (2003a), Kealhofer (2003b)) which extends the contingent claim 
framework of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974).  Crosbie and Bohn (2003) provide further detail on how Moody’s 
implements the Vasicek-Kealhofer model to construct their EDF measure. The measure we use is constructed from the recently 
recalibrated model (2007) which incorporates a larger default dataset and improved estimation techniques that derive the EDF term 
structure from credit migration.  The previous calibration of the model was developed with data available in 1995. 
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4 The Compustat data item for credit rating is SPLTICRM, which is defined as the Standard & Poor’s current opinion of an issuer’s 
overall creditworthiness, apart from its ability to repay individual obligations, and it focuses on the obligor’s capacity and willingness 
to meet its long-term financial commitments. 
5 Observations with credit ratings indicating default are excluded from our analysis. We also exclude observations with CCC-, CCC, 
and CCC+ ratings as the number of firms with such ratings is very small in our sample.  
6 See Graham (1996a, 1996b) and Graham et al. (1998) for details of the procedure used to simulate the marginal tax rates. 
7 Compustat coverage of credit ratings starts in 1985. 
8 The exception is the book debt ratio, which is trimmed to exclude observations with book debt ratios of one or higher. 
9 In a recent report, Standard & Poor’s Credit Rating Services documents that industrial firms display a steady decline in average 
credit quality over the past decade from a median rating of A in 1980, to BBB- in 1997, to BB- in 2007.   
10 Age is the natural log of the number of years since the firm appeared first in Compustat. Size is the natural log of sales (SALE), 
adjusted for inflation. Tangibility is the property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) scaled by total assets (AT). Profitability is operating 
income (OIBDP) scaled by lagged total assets. Market-to-book ratio is market value of assets over total assets. Market value of assets 
is (total assets – book equity + market equity). Book equity is the book value of stockholders’ equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes 
and investment tax credit if available (TXDITC), minus the book value of preferred stock. Depending on availability, we use the   40
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
redemption (PSTKRV), liquidation (PSTKL), or par value (PSTK) to estimate the book value of preferred stock. Stockholders’ equity 
is (SEQ), if it is available. If not, we measure stockholders’ equity as the book value of common equity (CEQ) plus the par value of 
preferred stock, or the book value of assets minus total liabilities (LT).  Book debt/capital is the sum of long-term (DLTT) and short-
term debt (DLC) scaled by book capital defined as the sum of short-term and long-term debt and book equity. Market debt/capital is 
the sum of long-term and short-term debt scaled by market capital defined as the sum of short-term and long-term debt and market 
equity.   
11 R&D is the research and development expense (XRD) scaled by sales. Selling expense is selling, general, and administrative 
expense (XSGA) scaled by sales. Market-to-book is market value of assets/total assets. Operating risk is measured as the standard 
deviation of operating income scaled by lagged total assets, measured over the previous five years. We require at least four non-
missing observations of operating income for this calculation. 
12 We use 49 industry definitions downloaded from Kenneth French’s online data library. 
13 The evidence in Kisgen (2006) and Kisgen (2009) indicate that firms are mindful of their credit rating targets when choosing their 
debt ratios.  In particular he finds that firms are more likely to reduce their debt ratios when they have a minus rating or shortly after 
being downgraded. 
14 Welch (2007) argues persuasively that debt plus equity is the best deflator for these studies. Other studies (e.g., Hovakimian, Opler,   41
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
and Titman (2001), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008)) have used debt ratios scaled by assets (book 
or market). We have also experimented with such alternative definitions of leverage. Our conclusions remained unchanged.  
15 In their hand-collected sample of 5,529 observations, Cantillo and Wright (2000) find only 18 observations where a firm had a bond 
rating but no public debt and only 135 observations where a firm had public debt but no bond rating.  
16 Maddala (1983) provides an in-depth discussion of models with self-selectivity. 
17 Following Faulkender and Petersen (2006), this variable is calculated as ln(1+fraction rated), where fraction rated is the fraction of 
rated firms in the industry, which we define based on the 49-industry classification. 
18 The logit transformation is widely used in modeling probability of default to ensure that predicted default rate fall in the range [0,1]. 
See, for example, Altman and Rijken (2004). 
19 The negative estimates in the leverage regressions are also inconsistent with the evidence in Graham et al. (1998), which finds that 
firms with high marginal tax rates tend to have high leverage ratios.   
20 The regression results are not reported due to brevity but are available upon request. 
21 See Parsons and Titman (2009) for a discussion of the literature that examines the relation between cash flow volatility and capital 
structure.  It should be noted that the observed positive relation between operating risk and leverage is not due to collinearity with 
other independent variables as this relation remains positive even when other independent variables are excluded from the regressions.   42
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
We should also note that although the correlation between operating risk and leverage is positive in the sample of rated firms 
represented in Table 4, the correlation is negative in the overall sample.   
22 One caveat of using regressions with fixed effects is that the fixed effects may pick up the effects of debt ratios on default 
probability, which would defeat our deliberate omission of debt ratios from regression model (1). 
23 Further (unreported) analysis suggests that a possible reason for the positive sign on tangibility in this specification is that there is 
generally very little firm level variation in tangible assets, but that we occasionally observe substantial increases in tangible assets that 
occur as a result of acquisitions, and these are often associated with major increases in leverage.  Moreover, we also observe 
substantial declines in tangible assets that arise from asset sales whose proceeds are often used to pay down debt.  
24 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this potential explanation. 
25 Practically all firms with long-term rating of AA- or higher receive the highest commercial paper rating (A-1+), almost all firms 
rated A+ or A receive the second highest commercial paper rating (A-1). 
26 Following earlier studies, we use the predicted value of debt/capital from regression reported in Table 6 as our proxy for the target 
debt/capital. 